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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
vs.

;
[
]
<

DIANE DUNN,

i;

Plaintiff and Appellee,

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

CaseNo.20030573-CA

<

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction in this case pursuant to
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e) (1953 as amended). Appellant was convicted of the misdemeanor crimes
of Driving Under the Influence and Speeding in the Third Judicial District Court,
Salt Lake Department, before the Honorable William W. Barrett, Judge.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Whether the trial court incorrectly decided and denied the motion to find
Ms. Dunn guilty of Reckless Driving under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45 rather than
guilty of Driving under the Influence of Alcohol and Speeding.
1

Standard of Review.
A trial court's determination of the law is reviewed for "correctness."
Application of the "correctness" standard means the appellate court decides the
matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination
of law. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) (citing State v. Deli. 861
P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993); see Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n. 858 P.2d
1381, 1383 (Utah 1993)).

2.

Whether the trial court incorrectly ruled that the Shondel principles

did not apply to find Ms. Dunn guilty of Reckless Driving under Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-45 rather than guilty of Driving under the Influence of Alcohol and Speeding.
Standard of Review.
The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness and are
accorded no deference by the reviewing court. State v. Deli. 861 P.2d 431,433
(Utah 1993); State v. Wilcox. 808 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Utah 1991); State v. Ramirez.
817 P.2d 774, 781-82 (Utah 1991).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The Due Process Clause of the United States and Utah Constitutions are
presented for interpretation, and they provide:
Amendment V of the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
2

[N]or shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.
Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
Section 1. [N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.
Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution [Due Process of Law] provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutes are contained verbatim either in the text of this brief
or in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.

§ 41-6-44 (Addendum A)
§ 41-6-45 (Addendum A; Text of the Brief, page 8)
§ 41-6-46 (Addendum A)
§ 41-6-61 (Addendum A)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the case.
Diane Dunn was charged by the State of Utah with the class B misdemeanor
offense of Driving Under the Influence, and the class C misdemeanor offense of
Speeding of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44, and § 41-6-46, respectively. A bench trial
was scheduled in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake Department, before
3

the Honorable William W. Barrett, the defendant and prosecution stipulated to the
facts that supported those charges. The defendant and prosecution also stipulated
to the additional violation of Unsafe Lane Travel in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-61. Defendant then moved to reduce all of the charges to Reckless Driving, a
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45(l)(b) (Supp. 2002)
("Reckless Driving statute") arguing that the requirement of three or more moving
traffic violations under the Reckless Driving statute had been met.
The defendant argued that the rules of statutory construction required that
the three moving traffic violations under Title 41, Chapter 6, of the Traffic Rules
and Regulations within a single continuous driving period, merge into the single
offense of Reckless Driving. The defendant also argued that the principles that
underlie Utah's Shondel doctrine require the court to sentence identical offenses
with differing levels of punishment at the lower level of punishment.
B. Course of the proceedings.
In lieu of trial the parties stipulated to facts establishing that on the date in
question Ms. Dunn committed the following traffic offenses: (1) Driving Under the
Influence of Alcohol in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44; (2) Speeding, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46; (3) Unsafe lane travel in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §41-6-61.
4

Following the acceptance of those stipulated facts, Ms. Dunn made a motion
to the court and argued, pursuant to the state statute, that the stipulation required
the court to enter a conviction for the sole crime of Reckless Driving, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45(l)(b). The trial court denied that motion.
C. Disposition at the trial court.
After denial of the motion, Judge Barrett entered judgment against Ms. Dunn
for the class B misdemeanor crime of Driving Under the Influence in the Vehicle,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44, and Speeding, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-46. Ms. Dunn timely appealed.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant Diane Dunn was charged by the State of Utah with the
misdemeanor crimes of Driving Under the Influence and Speeding. (R. 2-4). Ms.
Dunn appeared for trial in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake Department,
before the Honorable William W. Barrett, where the parties stipulated to facts
establishing that on November 10, 2001, in a series of acts within a single
continuous period of driving, Ms. Dunn committed the following traffic offenses:
(1) Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 416-44; (2) Speeding, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46; and (3) Unsafe
Lane Travel, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-61. (R. 35-37).
5

Ms. Dunn moved and argued, pursuant to statute, that the stipulation
required the court to enter a conviction for the sole crime of Reckless Driving, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45(l)(b). The trial court denied that motion.
(R. 42-48).
Judgment was entered against Ms. Dunn for Driving Under the Influence
and Speeding. (R. 42-48).
Ms. Dunn timely appealed to this Court.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Long standing rules of statutory construction and the Shondel line of cases
jointly and severally demonstrate that the trial court committed error when it
incorrectly ruled denying Ms. Dunn's motion to merge the four traffic offenses she
committed during a single continuous period of driving into the single charge of
Reckless Driving.
The Court should reverse the conviction of Ms. Dunn for Driving under the
Influence of Alcohol and Speeding and remand the matter to the trial court for a
new sentencing hearing on the class B misdemeanor offense of Reckless Driving.
6

ARGUMENT

POINT L THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT MS.
DUNN WAS GUILTY OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
ALCOHOL AND SPEEDING RATHER THAN THE CRIME OF RECKLESS
DRIVING.

The Reckless Driving statute, as amended in 2000, reads as follows:
41-6-45. Reckless driving - Penalty.
(1) A person is guilty of reckless driving who operates a vehicle:
(a) in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property; or
(b) while committing three or more moving traffic violations under Title 41,
Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations, in a series of acts within a single
continuous period of driving.
(2) A person who violates Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45 (2000)(emphasis added). Notably, Subsection (l)(b),
italicized above, is the newly amended language effective July of 2000, as well as
the amendment at issue in Ms. Dunn' request to the trial court to merge the three
traffic violations into the single offense of Reckless Driving.
The trial court denied that Motion. The trial court's decision is in error.
The charge of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol is codified at Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-44, and is inarguably a "moving traffic violation under Title 41,
Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations." Also inarguable is the stipulation that
recognized the factual existence of a series of acts within a single continuous
7

period of driving where three moving traffic violations occurred. Therefore, the
Reckless Driving statute applies and the trial court should have granted Ms. Dunn'
motion. To have done otherwise contorts the plain language of the statute and
reads into the statute a meaning or intent not otherwise present and in violation of
longstanding rules of statutory construction.
Our Utah Supreme Court has instructed as follows:
The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that statutes are generally
to be construed according to their plain language. Unambiguous language in
the statute may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning.
State v. Redd. 1999 UT 108 PI 1, 992 P.2d 986. (quoting Zoll & Branch P.C. v.
Asay, 932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted); see also Kimball Condo.
Owners Ass'n v. County Bd. of Equalization. 943 P.2d 642, 648 (Utah 1997)).
The Supreme Court has also explained:
The general rule is that "when faced with a question of statutory
construction, we look first to the plain language of the statute. Stephens v.
Bonneville Travel. Inc.. 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997) (citation omitted).
Moreover, "courts are not to infer substantive terms into the text that are not
already there. Rather, the interpretation must be based on the language
used, and the court has no power to rewrite the statute to conform to an
intention not expressed.'' Berrett v. Purser & Edwards. 876 P.2d 367, 370
(Utah 1994).
State v. Rudolph. 970 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1998)(citations in original; emphasis
added).
8

Finally, the Court explained the rationale behind such long-standing rules of
statutory construction. The Court stated:
Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look
beyond the same to divine legislative intent. The reason for such a rule is
clear. It prevents judges from "finding11 an ambiguity in even the most plain
language of a constitutional or statutory provision as an excuse to search the
legislative history in an attempt to justify an interpretation they prefer.
Salt Lake Citv v. Ohms. 881 P.2d 844, 850 n.14 (Utah 1994) (quoting Brinkerhoff
v. Forsvth. 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989)).
This Court has followed these rules as addressed by the Supreme Court and
further detailed the rules of statutory interpretation by, on more than one occasion,
addressing such issues through string citations of cases demonstrating the
importance of the rules of statutory construction. Recently this Court has written:
[W]hen interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to evince the true intent and
purpose of the Legislature. To discern the legislature's intent and purpose,
we look first to the best evidence of a statute's meaning, the plain language
of the act. Moreover, we do not look beyond a statute's plain language unless
it is ambiguous.
State v. McKinnon. 2002 UT App 214, P6, 51 P.3d 729 (quoting State v. Tooele
County, 2002 UT 8, P10, 44 P.3d 680 (citations omitted); Coleman v. Thomas,
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2000 UT 53, P9,4 P.3d 783)(footnote omitted). This Court also has previously
stated:
Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look
beyond the same to divine legislative intent. Rather, we are guided by the
rule that a statute should generally be construed according to its plain
language." Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth. 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989); accord
Salt Lake Therapy Clinic. 890 P.2d at 1020 ('"When language is clear and
unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left
for construction.'" (citation omitted));
Brendle v. City of Draper. 937 P.2d 1044 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); see also A.E.
Christean. 938 P.2d 811 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); In re. A.B. 936 P.2d
1091 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
The Utah Reckless Driving statute, as amended in 2000, reads as follows:
41-6-45. Reckless Driving - Penalty.
(1) A person is guiltyof reckless driving who operates a vehicle:
(a) in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, or
(b) while committing three or more moving traffic violations under Title 41,
Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations, in a series of acts within a single
continuous period of driving.
(2) A person who violates Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45 (2000)(emphasis added).
The language of § 41-6-45(l)(b) is in no way ambiguous. Section 41-645(1 )(b) plainly and unequivocally states that "[a] person is guilty of reckless
driving who operates a vehicle while committing three or more moving traffic

10

violations under Title 41, Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations, in a series of
acts within a single continuous period of driving."
The Reckless Driving statute, § 41-6-45 noticeably falls between Driving
under the influence and Speeding in the traffic code along with the other violation.
All are moving violations and the Reckless Driving statute simply must be
interpreted and applied to cases like this of Ms. Dunn without the court reading
more intent into the statute beyond that which is plainly present on its face. The
trial court erred when it avoided the plain language of § 41-6-45(l)(b) and required
more to be read into the Reckless Driving statute.
This same issue has been presented to this Court in State v. Hernandez, 76
P.2d 198 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). The opinion in the Hernandez case was likewise in
error. This Court acknowledged this statutory issue made by Mr. Hernandez by
noting the claim without comment in footnote 1 of the opinion. Id at 200. The
Hernandez court, however, avoided addressing this first argument by merely
stating in footnote 3 that it chose not to address the argument because the Shondel
rule required a comparison of the two statutes. Id The failure of the Hernandez
court to consider and correctly rule on the statutory construction issue should not
preclude this Court from addressing this issue at this time as raised by Ms. Dunn.
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To do otherwise would threaten the due process rights that Ms. Dunn enjoys under
both the federal and state constitutions.
Interpreting statutes by reference to legislative history or debates in an
attempt to justify an interpretation the court prefers actually erodes the notice
requirement founded in constitutionally safeguarded due process. See Norman J.
Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 45.08, 35 (5th ed. 1992). An accused is
entitled to rely on the plain language of a statute to predict the anticipated
resolution in a matter. Salt Lake Citv v. Ohms. 881 P.2d 844, 850 n.14 (Utah
1994).
Under the analysis of the Hernandez court, subsection (l)(b) is without
meaning and can never be applied to any combination of moving traffic violations.
The Hernandez court's decision eviscerates the entirety of the (l)(b) amendment
because it rules that the presence of the elements of the other moving traffic
violations prevents the merging of the three or more crimes to create a reckless
driving violation. The Hernandez court declared, bv the presence of the other
moving traffic violations, that their different elements prevent treating them in any
other fashion than separate chargeable offenses.1 By only addressing the Shondel
1

The Hernandez court stated in its ruling:
[f 13]... To prove this, the State must prove the underlying elements of at least
three "moving traffic violations under Title 41, Chapter 6." Id. Therefore, section
12

rule, as the Hernandez court did, its analysis mandates that any three or more
moving traffic violations could never be reckless driving under (l)(b). Therefore,
by electing to avoid the statutory argument and focus solely on the Shondel
analysis, the Hernandez court effectively has legislated away any meaning and
application of subsection (l)(b).
Ms. Dunn is entitled to the plain language and meaning of the statute
without more being read into the otherwise unambiguous language. To the extent
the result of this ruling is somehow contrary to the desires of some or perhaps even
the interests of justice, that question is for the legislature and not the courts to
address and repair. In the meantime, this Court's obligations are clear under the
statutory construction rules outlined above, to-wit: this Court should reverse the
conviction and remand with an order to the District Court to enter a conviction for
reckless driving.

41-6-45(l)(b) will always require proof of additional elements beyond any single
"moving traffic violation[] under Title 41, Chapter 6," id., including driving under
the influence of alcohol with a passenger under sixteen years of age in the vehicle
under section 41-6-44.
f 14 Because "the elements of the crime[s] are not identical and the relevant
statutes require proof of some fact or element not required to establish the
other, the statutes do not proscribe the same conduct."
State v. Green, 2000 UT App 33, ^[6, 995 p.2d 1250 (quotations and citations
omitted). Therefore, the Shondel rule is inapplicable in this case.
Hernandez, at 201.
13

POINT II. THE SHONDEL LINE OF CASES DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT
MS. DUNN'S CONVICTION BE ENTERED FOR THE LESSER PUNISHED
CRIME OF RECKLESS DRIVING.
Where two statutes prohibit the commission of a particular act and different
penalties are provided under each statute, the accused is entitled to the lesser
punishment. State v. Shondel. 435 P.2d 146 (Utah 19691 The Shondel rule
provides that "where there is doubt or uncertainty as to which of two punishments
is applicable to an offense, an accused is entitled to the benefit of the lesser." Id. at
148. This long standing principle of law supports Ms. Dunn' position in this
appeal. See also State v. Loveless. 581 P.2d 575 (Utah 1978).
Because § 41-6-45 incorporates each of the three or more traffic violations
into the Reckless Driving charge, the elements of each individual traffic violation,
including driving under the influence, are incorporated verbatim into the statute.
The elements of all three of the offenses must be established to meet the (l)(b)
requirement. The Driving Under the Influence charge is a class B misdemeanor
with a minimum mandatory sentence. Reckless Driving is a class B misdemeanor
that does not include a minimum mandatory sentence. In addition, the possible
sentences for the offenses of Speeding and Unsafe Lane Travel come into play.
Accordingly, Shondel and its progeny operate to guarantee that Ms. Dunn's
conviction is a B misdemeanor under the Reckless Driving charge with the
14

remaining offenses of Driving Under the Influence, Speeding, and Unsafe Lane
Travel being merged into the single B misdemeanor by virtue of the commission of
the other traffic violations occurring within a single continuous period of driving as
required by the statute and as stipulated to by the parties.
The Hernandez court's opinion that attempts to use the different elements
argument of Shondel to avoid the plain language of the statute and require a ruling
against Ms. Dunn is in error. The Hernandez court opined:
Based on the plain language of these two statutes, we conclude that each of
them requires proof of elements not required by the other. To convict a
defendant of violating the part of section 41-6-44 under which Hernandez
was charged, the State is required to prove that the defendant had a "blood or
breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of operation
or actual physical control" of the vehicle and that the defendant "had a
passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle a the time of the offense." IdL
§41-6-44(2)(a)(iii), (3)(a)(ii)(B). The State is not specifically required to
prove these two elements to convict a defendant under section 41-6-45(l)(b).
See id. §41-6-45(l)(b),
State v. Hernandez, 76 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). With all due respect
to this court, this statement is in error. As indicated earlier, each moving traffic
violation found in Title 41, Chapter 6 of the code is expressly adopted into the
Reckless Driving statute of (l)(b) without exception. There then cannot be a
"different elements" application in this case in light of the stipulated facts
establishing each element to have been present for the violations to merge to
15

become Reckless Driving. Neither the trial court nor this court should attempt to
reach a desired end result distinct from the plain language of the statute. If the
punishment provided in Title 41, Chapter 6 of the traffic code is perceived as
improper, it is for the legislature, and not the courts, to remedy. State v. Bryan.
709 P.2d 257, 263-64 (Utah 1985).
In Bryan, the Utah Supreme Court examined a conflict in the punishment of
behavior duplicated in two statutes, one from the criminal code, and a second
statute from the traffic code. The behavior at issue prohibited by the traffic code
was the reckless disregard of the safety of another which resulted in death as
compared against the recklessly caused death from the criminal manslaughter code.
The Court noted the following:
This Court does not declare statutes unenforceable or unconstitutional
because they could have been better drafted; indeed it has long been the law
that we attempt to construe statutes to be constitutional. Nor are we
concerned with legislative policy decisions embodied in statutes.
Nevertheless, we cannot disregard our responsibility to assure the rational
and evenhanded application of the criminal laws. Equal protection of the law
guarantees like treatment of all those who are similarly situated.
Accordingly, the criminal laws must be written so that there are significant
differences between offenses and so that the exact same conduct is not
subject to different penalties depending under which of two statutory
sections a prosecutor chooses to charge. That would be a form of
arbitrariness that is foreign to our system of law. The Legislature may make
automobile homicide committed recklessly either a misdemeanor or a
felony, but it cannot make the crime both a felony and a misdemeanor,
16

leaving the choice to the prosecutor as to whether he charges a felony or a
misdemeanor.
Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263 (citations omitted). The Court reversed that case and
remanded for sentencing consistent with the decision. In supporting that ruling
the Court further explained:
It is a matter for the legislature to fix what the punishment for reckless
disregard of human life should be. Clearly it can make the penalty a felony;
but it cannot allow the prosecutor to make the decision for it. The
established law is that a defendant is entitled to be sentenced under the
negligent homicide statute in the motor vehicle code, rather than the
manslaughter provision in the criminal code. If the punishment provided in
the motor vehicle code is not appropriate to the gravity of the crime, it is for
the legislature to make the necessary change in the law.
Id. at 264.
Notably, the concurring opinion of then Chief Justice Hall was even more
expressive regarding the disparate obligations of the Court and the legislature. The
opinion stated:
The lack of distinction between the two statutes compels this Court to reach
a result that does not adequately punish the offender. Further, the result,
while necessary under the laws, does not meet what appears to have been the
legislative intent in enacting the manslaughter statute. In any event, the lack
of any distinction between the two statutes is intolerable and is deserving of
prompt legislative action.
Bryan, 709 P.2d at 264 (concurring opinion). Fortunately, the decision in this case,
while possibly equally undesirable from the lower court's perspective, and perhaps
17

this court as well, is far less egregious than that in Bryan. There the difference is
between a second degree felony and a misdemeanor; here, the difference is
between a combination of a class B misdemeanor and two class C misdemeanors,
and a single class B misdemeanor.

CONCLUSION

Appellant Diane Dunn respectfully requests that this Court to review the
statutory construction issues and supporting Shondel argument presented herein,
and for all or any of the reasons stated, to correct the decision of the trial court and
reverse the conviction for Driving Under the Influence and remand the matter for
sentencing for the crime of Reckless Driving.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2^6 day of November, 2003.

B E N j A ^ f ^ . HAMILTON
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATION
I, BENJAMIN A. HAMILTON, hereby certify that I have caused eight
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Appeals, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and two copies of the
foregoing Brief of the Appellant were delivered to the Office of the District
Attorney for Salt Lake County, 2001 South State Street, S-3700, Salt Lake City,
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Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

Title 41, Chapter 6
Traffic Rules and Regulations
(in order)
41-6-44. [In pertinent part - - emphasis added] Driving under the influence of alcohol,
drugs, or a combination of both or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol
concentration — Measurement of blood or breath alcohol — Criminal punishment —
Arrest without warrant — Penalties — Suspension or revocation of license.

(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this
state if the person:
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the person
has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test;
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and
any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or
(Hi) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of
operation or actual physical control
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally
entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any charge of violating this section.
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 100
milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon grams of
alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsection (2) is
guilty of a:
(i) class B misdemeanor.

41-6-45, Reckless driving — Penalty,
(1) A person is guilty of reckless driving who operates a vehicle:
(a) in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property; or
(b) while committing three or more moving traffic violations under Title 41, Chapter 6,
Traffic Rules and Regulations, in a series of acts within a single continuous period of driving.
(2) A person who violates Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52 § 35; C. 1943, 57-7-112; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 9; 1986, ch. 178 §
30; 1987, ch. 138, § 44; 1987, ch. 204, § 1; 2000, ch. 25, § 2.
Amendment Notes. - The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, added Subsection (1)
(b), deleted gradual sentencing requirements for first and second or subsequent
convictions of reckless driving in Subsection (2), and made related changes.

41-6-46. Speed regulations — Safe and appropriate speeds at certain locations —
Prima facie speed limits — Emergency power of the governor.
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent
under the existing conditions, giving regard to the actual and potential hazards then
existing, including when:
(a) approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing;
(b) approaching and going around a curve;
(c) approaching a hill crest;
(d) traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway; and
(e) special hazards exist due to pedestrians, other traffic, weather, or highway conditions.
(2) If no special hazard exists, and subject to Subsection (4) and Sections 41-6-47 and 416-48, the following speeds are lawful:
(a) 20 miles per hour in a reduced speed school zone as defined in Section 41-6-20.1;
(b) 25 miles per hour in any urban district; and
(c) 55 miles per hour in other locations.
(3) Except as provided in Section 41-6-48.5, any speed in excess of the limits provided in
this section or established under Section 41-6-47 or 41-6-48, is prima facie evidence that
the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful.
(4) The governor by proclamation in time of war or emergency may change the speed
limits on the highways of the state.

41-6-61. Roadway divided into marked lanes -- Provisions — Traffic-control devices.
On a roadway divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic the following
provisions apply:
(1) A vehicle shall be operated as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane and may
not be moved from the lane until the operator has determined the movement can be made safely.
(2) On a roadway divided into three lanes and providing for two-way movement of
traffic, a vehicle may not be operated in the center lane except:
(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle traveling in the same direction, and
when the center lane is clear of traffic within a safe distance; or
(b) in preparation of making or completing a left turn or where the center lane is allocated
exclusively to traffic moving in the same direction that the vehicle is proceeding and the
allocation is designated by official traffic-control devices.
(3) Official traffic-control devices may be erected directing specified traffic to use a
designated lane or designating those lanes to be used by traffic moving in a particular
direction regardless of the center of the roadway. Operators of vehicles shall obey the
directions of these devices.
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D4 THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs.

DIANE DUNN,
Defendant.

Case No. 015912450
Judge WILLIAM W. BARRETT

This matter came before the court for trial on June 10, 2002. The facts of the case were
stipulated to by both parties. It was stipulated that the defendant was in violation of Driving
Under the Influence, Unsafe Lane Travel, and Speeding in violation of Section 41-6-44,41-661,41-6-46 of the Utah Code Annotated. The Defendant argued that the Reckless Driving statute
jnder 41-6-45(1 )(b) requires that when an individual violates three or more moving traffic
notations under Title 41, Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations, in a series of acts within a
ingle continuous period of driving that the person is no longer guilty of each of the individual
•affic crimes but is rather guilty of Reckless Driving. The defendant argued that this result is
rquired under State v. Shondel. 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), and the rules of statutory

construction. The court finds that the defendant's arguments are without merit.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion be and hereby is DENIED and
the defendant is adjudicated guilty of Driving Under the Influence and Speeding.
ORDERED this ^&?day ofJ]W2002.
BY THE COURT:

lAlM^fdfllM^
Judge WILLIAM W. BARRETT
District Court Judgg
Approved as to form:

JR^ORXMrw^RNI
Deputy Salt'Ltoke District Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the \ )

day of June, 2002, a true and correct copy of

foregoing Order was hand delivered or mailed, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:

Gregory Warner
Salt Lake District Attorney's Office
2001 South State St., S3700
Salt Lake City, UT 84190
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